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BREXIT:  A Bolt from the Blue! – Red Sky in the Morning? 
 
by Sarah Jane Fox* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
After membership in the EU lasting more than forty years, the United Kingdom held a 
referendum in June 2016 to decide whether to remain in the EU or to leave. While the 
result was close, the majority of the voting population opted to leave. This paper reflects 
upon the possible consequences to U.K. airlines and the traveling public in order to 
consider whether, after the exit, there will be “red skies at night” after the initial “red skies 
in the morning” – warning, which undoubtedly is the current indicator level. 
 
In considering the possible rationale and reasoning for the decision, the research considers 
crucial related aspects such as sovereignty and governance – linked to nationality and 
borders – issues that have undeniably affected aviation development. 
 
This paper explores the relationship of the EU and UK and the advancement of air transport 
in the EU, of which the UK has been a significant part – questioning what is next for the UK 
after Brexit.  Consideration is given to low cost carrier development in the UK and the 
metamorphosis of British Airways during the aviation policy development and 
liberalization process in the EU, both internally and externally. 
 
Whilst considerable uncertainty exists – for the UK and, indeed, the EU – the underlying 
concern remains for the impending risk to aviation advancement as a result of Brexit.  Time 
cannot be turned back, but the future of aviation may see regression rather than 
progression. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On June 23, 2016 the United Kingdom held a national referendum to assess whether the 
voting population wished the nation to remain a member or cease membership in the European 
Union (EU).  According to then-Prime Minister David Cameron, it was “one of the biggest 
decisions [the] country face[d] in [the populations’] lifetimes:  whether to remain in a reformed 
EU or to leave.”1 
He added, “[t]he choice goes to the heart of the kind of country we want to be and the 
future we want for our children.”2 
Twenty-four hours later, Cameron resigned, after reportedly being “left shocked and 
distraught” by the narrow decision to leave, with 52 percent of the vote in favor of the exit.3  In 
the final few days of campaigning, the polls had indicated a more comfortable margin in support 
of remaining in the Union.  For Cameron, and undoubtedly for the vast majority of the country, 
the decision was quite literally a “bolt from the blue.”  Post-referendum reflection has since 
indicated that the exit vote had contained a percentage of the electorate registering a protest 
campaign against factors that they were unhappier about; however, the fact remains that the 
narrow majority had signaled the intention for a British and Northern Ireland EU exit – BREXIT 
had become a reality. 
The repercussions of the referendum continue to reverberate, not only across the U.K. but 
throughout Europe as Britain and Northern Ireland’s position remains unclear. 
However, somewhat ironically, the majority of the younger electorate had voiced their 
unanimity in a “remain vote” – the future of the country was speaking, but the majority were not 
to listen.  Chart 1 shows the voting decision by age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 EU Referendum to Take Place on 23 June, David Cameron Confirms, THEGUARDIAN.COM (Feb. 20, 2016), 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/20/cameron-set-to-name-eu-referendum-date-after-cabinet-meeting. 
2 Id. 
3 David Cameron Resigns after UK Votes to Leave European Union, THEGUARDIAN.COM (June 24, 2016), 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/david-cameron-resigns-after-uk-votes-to-leave-european-union. 
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Chart 1: Decision by age group 
(Authors: Based on data and information from Yougov/Politico4) 
Some might view the Brexit referendum as a positive victory for democracy and self-
determination,5 which, somewhat ironically became the guiding principle for the reconstruction 
of Europe following World Wars I and II.  Or, conversely, it was a spectacular act of national 
self-harm, where the decision to hold a referendum was based on a political leadership battle 
waged some months before as part of the general election process.  Either way, the result of the 
                                                        
4 18-24 year age group results:  remain – 75 percent; leave – 25 percent. 
25-49 year age group results:  remain – 56 percent; leave – 44 percent. 
50-64 year age group results:  remain – 44 percent; leave – 56 percent. 
65+ year age group results:  remain – 39 percent; leave – 61 percent. 
5 Self-determination is the right of a people to determine their own destiny.  The principle is evidently embodied in 
Article I of the Charter of the United Nations, having been incorporated into the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which evolved into the United Nations Charter.  The principle is viewed as being 
fundamental to the maintenance of friendly relations and peace among States.  It is recognized as a right of all 
peoples in the first Article common to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, which both entered into 
force in 1976.  Paragraph 1 of this Article provides:  “All peoples have the right to self-determination.  By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”  See also Wex, definition of “Self Determination” under international law, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/self_determination_international_law. 
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referendum could be viewed as a decision made by a voting population that was ill-informed as 
to the consequences of its actions and had limited knowledge and understanding of the fallout 
(political, economic, and social).6  While families remain divided and the younger generations 
express anger at their parents’ and grandparents’ decisions, the consequences for the U.K. are 
still uncertain – negotiations continue; however, the official notification has still not actually 
transpired.7  Ultimately, the effects of the EU exit will not relate to one part (or isolated parts) of 
the EU Treaties that the U.K. population disliked, for while, undoubtedly, the vote reflected the 
fear of immigration and what was perceived as a Brussels takeover of U.K. sovereignty against a 
backdrop of economic austerity, the consequences will also resonate upon areas the population 
favored and supported, such as safeguards in the workplace/worker rights, more equality, free 
movement of goods and people, including cheaper airfares, and the ease of travel and protection 
of travelers’ rights across the EU, etc. 
This paper reflects upon the latter element – namely the possible consequences to U.K. 
airlines and the traveler, in order to consider whether, after the exit, there will be red skies at 
night after the initial “red skies in the morning”8– warning; which, undoubtedly is the current 
indicator level. 
Initially, context is provided by postulating a detailed picture to the reader of the U.K.’s 
relationship with, and within, the EU and the current position with regard to EU aviation policy 
and its development over a number of years.  Consideration as to future consequences and 
scenarios is focused around several key background events and results. 
                                                        
6 One of the largest Internet hits ever recorded occurred a day after the vote, for the search term, “what is the EU?”  
See Brian Fung, The British Are Frantically Googling What the E.U. Is, Hours After Voting to Leave It, 
WashingtonPost.com, June 24 2016, http://wpo.st/uMsq1.  See also Jeff John Roberts, Brits Scramble to Google 
“What is the EU?” Hours After Voting to Leave It, FORTUNE.COM, June 24, 2016, 
http://fortune.com/2016/06/24/brexit-google-trends/. 
7 Article 50, Treaty on European Union (TEU) states: 
1.  Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements.  
2.  A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. 
In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and 
conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking 
account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.  That agreement shall be 
negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.  It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.  
3.  The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the 
withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, 
unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously 
decides to extend this period. 
The formal procedure requires that the Member State notify the European Council of its wish to withdraw, declaring 
its intention to do so.  The timing of this notification lies entirely in the hand of the Member State concerned, and 
informal discussions are able to take place between it and other Member States and/or EU institutions prior to the 
notification. 
8 “Red sky at night, sailors’ delight.  Red sky at morning, sailors take warning” is a saying/proverb which arguably 
is traceable back to the Bible.  See Matthew 16:2–3.  It should be noted that some versions also relate the warning to 
shepherds.  See also Jerry D. Hill, Kentucky Weather 139 (2005). 
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However, first it is crucial to appreciate the aspect of sovereignty and the origins of the 
U.K. (as it currently stands) – so as to understand better the possible rationale of the U.K. Brexit 
decision – for what could now be viewed as a segregated Britain. 
 
2. Sovereignty 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary,9 sovereignty is defined, inter alia, as a supreme 
political authority which entails “the international independence of a state, combined with the 
right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation.”10 
The concept of sovereignty stems back to the signing of the Peace of Westphalia Treaty 
in 1648,11 which ended a 30-year religious war in Europe.  It is generally recognized by scholars 
that the origin of the principle of sovereignty can be found in this treaty, although arguably 
sovereignty itself is not clearly defined in the texts.12 
The Treaty however establishes three core ideologies: 
• The principle of state sovereignty; 
• The principle of (legal) equality of States; 
• The principle of non-intervention of one State in the international affairs of another. 
In essence, the philosophy was based upon a presumption that independence and isolation 
of each State would prevent future wars.13 
International law largely recognizes this philosophy by confirming that each nation-state 
has sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs.  This, therefore, in the main excludes the 
interference of external powers, the principle of non-interference in another country’s domestic 
affairs, while also recognizing the principle that every State (regardless of size) is equal in 
international law. 
In an aviation context, certainly, the Chicago Convention14 adheres to the principle of 
State sovereignty by recognizing this concept.  The U.K. is a founding signatory to the 
Convention, but it should be recalled that, during the negotiations in 1944, it was still in the 
midst of WWII, hence the U.K. did not support at that time a more liberalized approach to the 
economic areas – such as access for commercial activities.  It was therefore left to individual 
States to mutually exchange reciprocal commercial rights, with Article 6 providing that “[n]o 
scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting 
                                                        
9 Henry Black, Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed., The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 1995). 
10 Id. 
11 Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their Respective Allies, Oct. 24, 1648 
[hereinafter Treaty of Westphalia], http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp. 
12 Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 21 Int’l Hist. Rev. 569, 569 
(1999), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640869. 
13 Eric Engle, The Transformation of the International Legal System:  The Post-Westphalian Legal Order, 23 
Quinnipiac L. Rev. 23, 24 (2004). 
14 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 
(entered into force Apr. 4, 1947) [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. 
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State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance 
with the terms of such permission or authorization.”15 
Article 1 recognizes and reinforces from the outset that each contracting State has 
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.  Article 2 defines 
“territory” by stating that it “shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent 
thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State,” hence reinforcing 
the linkage back to another transport:  maritime transport and Laws of the Sea. 
Sovereign States continue to protect their State boundaries and borders, which over the 
years have seen many changes through warfare and acts of aggression, conquest, and 
declarations of independence.  Rarely are such changes amicably achieved, and disputes over 
territories are known to continue for decades, leading to acts of ongoing hostility. 
There is a symbiotic relationship among war, destruction, and, consequently, 
development, both in terms of legal/legislative and physical advancement.16  In modern-day 
warfare, aviation has become inextricably drawn into the equation, and this provides further 
reasons why civil aviation continues to battle old notions that no doubt impede upon the 
development of more modern ideas and prevent extension of the concept of more liberalized 
skies.  National sovereignty is still protected and held sacrosanct, and nowhere more so than in 
aviation, which continues to battle an archaic legacy inextricably linked to sovereign 
protectionism and ownership of a “national asset” – a throwback undoubtedly linked to its 
wartime origins (the Chicago Convention).17  The so-called “nationality clause”18 has, as a 
consequence, become embedded in most bilateral air service agreements, also due to “restrictive” 
government thinking, which has, for the most part, not become more progressive over time. 
That said, in terms of the original understanding of the Westphalian Treaty, arguably a 
more modernist view is emerging based upon a new, post-Westphalian doctrine of the 
international community, which has led to the belief that globalization had made the old 
approach anachronistic19 and has potentially led to the Westphalian system being superseded.  In 
1999, the U.K. Prime Minister of the day, Tony Blair, somewhat ironically, addressing an 
audience in Chicago, delivered a powerful monologue in which he stated that there was a need 
for a new world order.20  He said his speech was “dedicated to the cause of internationalism and 
against isolationism,” and that there was no place for isolation:  “isolationism has ceased to have 
a reason to exist.  By necessity we have to co-operate with each other across nations.”21 
Yet, debatably some 17 years later, the referendum vote by the U.K. population would 
tend to question the acceptance of this doctrine; certainly it would seem to in respect to the EU. 
                                                        
15 Id. art. 6. 
16 See generally Sarah Jane Fox, The Evolution of Aviation in Times of War and Peace:  Blood, Tears, and 
Salvation, Int’l J. World Peace, Dec. 2014, at 49. 
17 Id.  Sarah Jane Fox, CONTEST’ing Chicago Origins and Reflections:  Lest We Forget!, 8 Int’l J. Private L. 73–98 
(2015). 
18 See ICAO Secretariat, Liberalization of Air Carrier Ownership and Control 1, (ICAO, Working Paper No. 
ATConf/6-WP/12, 2012). 
19 See Michael Ross Fowler & Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State:  The Evolution and 
Application of the Concept of Sovereignty 2 (1995). 
20 Tony Blair, U.K. Prime Minister, Address at the Chicago Economic Club (Apr. 22, 1999). 
21 Id. 
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2.1. The United Kingdom 
Although the referendum vote was termed by the media as being a Brexit vote, 
technically this was an inaccurate description. 
The U.K. comprises the whole of the island of Great Britain, which includes England, 
Wales, and Scotland, as well as the northern part of the island of Ireland. 
However, the history of the U.K. as a collective unity is relatively new – only in 1707 did 
the transformation begin with the political union of the kingdoms of England and Scotland into 
what was deemed Great Britain.  England had already absorbed Wales (and Cornwall) by 1543.  
It was to be nearly another century before a further Act of Union, in 1800,22 resulted in the 
Kingdom of Ireland being added to create the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.  
However, these unions were surrounded by acts of aggression and a history of warfare and 
migration going back centuries among the various components – so to perhaps initially deem this 
as a union, certainly a welcomed one in the beginning, is grossly misleading.  In actual fact, the 
Irish union was to last little more than a century before separation occurred, leaving, by 1922, 
only six of the thirty-two counties remaining in what is now Northern Ireland.  The southern part 
– approximately 80 percent of the island – was to become the Republic of Ireland.23  
It is argued that three hundred years later, the Scottish-British Union “cannot be regarded 
as settled.”24  Certainly, the result of the referendum was to stir up old sentiments of 
independence in Scotland,25 in a country that is inherently supportive of the EU and remaining a 
member of the Union.  The “remain” camp was dominant both in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland26 (and London), with the highest share of the vote to remain being cast in Gibraltar.27 
 
3. The European Union 
The formulation of the EU has obvious links back to World War II; while the idea for a 
European Community was not new, the war provided the impetus for its creation.  Barnard 
describes the war as “the driving force behind the European Union. . . . the consolidation of a 
post-war system of inter-state co-operation and integration that would make pan-European 
armed conflicts inconceivable.”28  Hence, contrary to the Westphalian philosophy of isolation as 
a preventative measure of war, the EU is based upon the premise of regional “collective” unity as 
a method of sustaining peace.  In effect, the 1950s could be marked as stepping away from the 
traditionally held concept of Westphalian sovereignty, where sovereignty could be conceded (in 
                                                        
22 An Act for the Union of Great Britain and Ireland 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3 c. 67. 
23 The Republic of Ireland Act, 1948 (Act No. 22/1948) states:  “It is hereby declared that the description of the 
State shall be the Republic of Ireland.”  However, it is also commonly referred to as Eire. 
24 Allan I. Macinnes, Acts of Union:  The Creation of the United Kingdom, BBC.CO.UK, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/acts_of_union_01.shtml. 
25 On September 18, 2014, Scotland held a referendum voting on whether it should be an independent country.  The 
“No” side won, with 2,001,926 (55.3 percent) voting against independence and 1,617,989 (44.7 percent) voting in 
favor of independence.  This followed an agreement from London and Edinburgh, which led to the Scottish 
Independence Referendum Act (2013). 
26 Edinburgh polled over 74 percent for “Remain” and Belfast West polled 74.1 percent.  See EU Referendum:  The 
Result in Maps and Charts, BBC.COM, June 24, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36616028. 
27 Gibraltar voted 95.9 percent to remain.  Id. 
28 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms (2004). 
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parts) for the benefit of the functioning of the supranational institution – which was ultimately to 
become the European Union. 
However the process of European integration was not to be an immediate process, 
occurring in many stages across a number of years, aided by subsequent Treaty revisions. 
3.1. The EU-U.K. 
The U.K. was never a founding member of what is now the EU.  In fact, it was not until 
1973 that the Conservative (Tory) then-Prime Minister Edward Heath took the U.K. into the 
Community.29  In the same year, the Republic of Ireland also joined what was then the European 
Economic Community (EEC). 
That said, the U.K. had initially attempted to join several times before.  In 1961, the U.K. 
made its first application after it became apparent that it was in danger of political isolation as 
the Commonwealth and former “Empire” colonies were beginning to strike up agreements with 
the new regional bloc, which was fast receiving support also from the United States.  However, 
the initial application was vetoed by the French government in 1963, which also vetoed a second 
application, in 1967.  It was only in 1969 that it became known that a more favorable outlook 
would be taken to negotiation talks that would signal the U.K.’s accession into the EU. 
However, within the U.K. the decision to join was not welcomed by all of the population. 
The U.K.’s membership in the EU had long been one of the most divisive, emotive issues in 
national politics.  During the earlier membership talks, it had been the Labour party which had 
initially sought membership.  The swap between the Labour party wishing membership and the 
eventual Tory party taking the U.K. into the then-EEC was no doubt, on reflection, a destabilizer 
to the U.K. population – arguably, in the same way as it is today (as was revealed in the 2016 
referendum vote).  Ironically, in 1973 the political tension was resolved by requiring a 
referendum on whether the United Kingdom should remain part of the Community; and, in 1975 
the U.K., under the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson held a referendum (the last national 
one until 2016) – which resulted in a 67 percent vote in favor of continued membership.30 
The U.K. should be viewed as a nation that once flourished in maritime discovery and the 
conquering of distant lands and other nations, staking its sovereign claim and enforcing its 
political will on others. 
That said, there are two (linked) chains of thought stemming from this with regard to the 
uneasy acceptance and position of the U.K. within the EU: 
(i) That, as an empire-builder and also a major trading power, there was some 
inevitability that Britain would come into conflict with what was 
perceived as a union which required certain concessions viewed by the 
population (spurred on by the media) as an attempt by Brussels to take 
                                                        
29 European Communities Act 1972, c. 68, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1972/68/pdfs/ukpga_19720068_en.pdf. 
30 When Did Britain Decide to Join the European Union?, THE U.K. IN A CHANGING EUROPE, 
http://ukandeu.ac.uk/fact-figures/when-did-britain-decide-to-join-the-european-union/.  See 1975: UK Embraces 
Europe in Referendum, BBC On This Day, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/6/newsid_2499000/2499297.stm. 
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sovereign control.  In many ways, somewhat ironically, this could be 
viewed as role-reversal. 
Coupled with: 
(ii) There still remains an insular, island mentality which prevails above all 
else.  The U.K. in essence seeks to build more of a solitary empire where 
its waters act as a barrier and wall – that seek to keep, figuratively and 
physically, others out.  
According to the historian Vernon Bogdanor,31 this is based upon the imperial legacy 
where the navy protected the island; and, hence, the British people continue to resist ties with the 
continent, being accustomed to separation by water.  Ironically, these sentiments also reflect 
those of the French vetoing President, de Gaulle, in 1963.  Certainly, the U.K. has continued to 
express (via the media) that it does not want a relationship where it is subject to such perceived 
orders originating from other States or the center of a supranational organization – as is the EU.  
Based upon this reasoning and evaluation of British thinking, it would have to be questioned 
whether the referendum decision in June 2016 really was such a bolt from the blue.  That said, 
the same sentiments were clearly never expressed by Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland, 
neither of which have ever expressed the wish to separate from the EU. 
However, what seems to have been forgotten in the referendum result are the positive 
contributions made by the U.K. to the EU and vice versa.  Potentially, this has been recognized 
and appreciated by both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  For, as Professor Crafts 
explains, membership has improved the macroeconomics of the U.K.32  This has consequently 
improved trade and competition, and has led to a liberalized and harmonized approach, which 
has also inevitably increased access to new markets – none more apparent than through 
witnessing the advantages accorded to aviation and air services in particular over the last 20 
years. 
The primary purpose of the Treaty Establishing the European Community33 was to bring 
about the gradual integration of the States of Europe and to establish a common market founded 
on the four freedoms of movement (for goods, services, people, and capital) and on the gradual 
approximation of economic policies. 
The objective behind a single market was always to bring down barriers and simplify 
existing rules, thus enabling citizens in the EU to make the most of the opportunities offered to 
them by having direct access to the now 28 countries
 
that comprise the EU.  Arguably, transport 
has always had a key part to play in realizing this goal.  It was ultimately realized that “there can 
be no market without transport!”34  And, consequently,
 
without an efficient and effective 
                                                        
31 Vernon Bogdanor is a professor of government at King’s College London.  He is the author of The New British 
Constitution (2009) and THE COALITION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2011), wherein his thoughts are expressed.  See 
Sam Wilson, Britain and the EU:  A Long and Rocky Relationship, BBC.COM (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26515129. 
32 Nicholas Crafts, The Growth Effects of EU Membership for the U.K.:  Review of the Evidence (Soc. Mkt. Found., 
Global Perspectives Series, Paper No. 7, 2016), http://www.smf.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/SMF-CAGE-
The-Growth-Effects-of-EU-Membership-for-the-U.K.-a-Review-of-the-Evidence-.pdf. 
33 Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (now TFEU). 
34 European Comm’n, Road Transport, Europe on the Move 1 (2004) (emphasis added). 
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transport policy, the Internal Market could not be achieved. 
4. The EU Transport Policy – Aviation Developments . . . and the U.K. 
The transport chapter was an original element of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and has 
remained virtually unchanged in subsequent Treaty revisions.  The Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU) has 
only made few minor amendments.  While Article 91 TFEU re-emphasizes the “distinctive 
features of transport,” Article 100 TFEU, of the Transport Title, emphasizes that it “shall apply 
to transport by rail, road and inland waterways” but that the “European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may lay down 
appropriate provisions for sea and air transport.”  This demonstrates particularly the difference 
in terms of the “discretionary” aspect regarding both sea and air transportation. 
Although the wording changed very little for the first 30 years of the European 
Community, the transport policy itself35 remained effectively under the control of the individual 
governments.  During this time, the European Community was either unwilling or unable to 
implement the Common Transport Policy (CTP) as provided by the Treaty of Rome.36
  
During 
this time, liberalization was slow and inconsistencies across the EU remained.  It took the 
intervention of the Court of Justice37 in 1985 for progress to be made, when it was acknowledged 
that there was not a coherent set of rules and that, with regard to certain aspects of the transport 
policy, the Council had failed to fulfill its obligations.38  A month later, a program of legislative 
measures was introduced, the objective being to achieve an internal market by the end of 1992.39 
As a consequence of the lack of joint action, aviation had remained subject to individual 
Member States regulating their own domestic aviation policy until the mid-1980s/early ’90s, 
with intra-EU aviation not being controlled by a single agency, as had been the case in the 
United States.  Subsidies by each country to its State flag carrier had also been commonplace, 
which inevitably went against the policy direction for one internal, single market among the 
various airlines, resulting in higher fares and causing market distortion.  The EU, following the 
U.S. initiative of deregulation, and as a consequence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) case,40 began to adopt a series of packages to liberalize the EU internally (Table 
1:  Summary of EU Deregulation Packages).  This was also arguably due to consumer demands, 
given that global communications had enabled European customers to see the benefits of 
liberalization in the U.S. air transport market. 
 
 
                                                        
35 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 90–100, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 47, 85 (Ex. EC Treaty arts. 70–80). 
36 European Transport Policy for 2010:  Time to Decide, COM (2001) 370 final (Sept. 12, 2001).  Policy guidelines 
of the White Paper, at 6. 
37 Case 13/83, Parliament v. Council, 1985 E.C.R. 1513, ¶¶ 46–50. 
38 Id. ¶ 70 (“[T]hat in breach of the Treaty the Council has failed to ensure freedom to provide services in the sphere 
of international transport and to lay down the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport 
services in a Member State” (as stated in relation to road transport).).  The Treaty of Maastricht later reinforced this 
principle.  Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. 
39 Completing the Internal Market:  White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (1985) 310 
final (June 28–29, 1985). 
40 See supra note 37. 
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First Package: (adopted in December 
1987)  
- Council Regulation 3975/87 on 
the Application of the 
Competition Rules to Air 
Transport 
- Council Regulation 3976/87 on 
the Application of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreements 
and concerted parties 
- Council Directive 601/87 on Air 
Fares 
- Council Decision 602/87 on 
capacity-sharing and market 
access 
Summarized: 
This introduced the relaxation of 
established rules – for intra-EU traffic, 
limiting government rights re opposing 
new fares.  It extended flexibility to 
airlines re seat capacity-sharing. 
Second Package: (adopted in July1990) 
- Council Regulation 2343/90 on 
market access 
- Council Regulation 2342/90 on 
air fares 
- Council Regulation 2344/90 on 
the application of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreement 
and concerted parties 
Summarized:  
This extended market access, 
providing greater flexibility over fare-
setting and capacity-sharing. This led 
to the concept of “Community (EU) 
Carriers” being developed and having 
the right to carry unlimited cargo and 
passengers between their home State 
and other EU countries.  
Third Package: (adopted July 1992) 
- Council Regulation 2407/92 on 
licensing of air carriers 
- Council Regulation 2408/92 on 
market access 
- Council Regulation 2409/92 on 
fares and rates 
Summarized:  
This introduced the freedom to provide 
services within the EU and in 1997 the 
freedom to provide “cabotage,” the 
right of an airline of one Member State 
to operate routes within another 
Member State.  
Further reforms re: Public Service 
Obligation on routes, regarded as 
essential for regional development. 
Table 1 – Summary of EU Deregulation Packages 
Source:  Author 
The Third Package41 remained applicable for 15 years, being replaced by Regulation 
1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (the Air Services 
                                                        
41 Replacing Regulations 2407/92, 2408/92, 2409/92 as of Nov. 1, 2008. 
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Regulation).42  The Air Services Regulation added further simplicity and internal liberalization 
by setting out rules on: 
• Market access; 
• Public Service Obligations; 
• The granting of and oversight of operating licenses for Community (EU) Carriers; 
• Aircraft registration and leasing; 
• Pricing; and 
• Traffic distribution between airports. 
The U.K. was to play an instrumental part in this liberalization process, with the former 
flag carrier of the U.K. – British Airways – being one of the first airlines in the EU to experience 
privatization in 1987.  The process had begun under the Conservative Thatcher government in 
1981.  Thatcher, as Prime Minister, had herself many a tussle with the EU and only too clearly 
had shown her resentment of the control of Brussels.  However, how she would have voted in the 
2016 referendum is disputed by the Tories, who on the one hand saw her embracing 
liberalization and on the other disliking the hand of Brussels exerting political will in the U.K. 
As part of the BA privatization process, Lord King was appointed as the Chairman, 
charged with bringing the airline back to profitability.  And some 10 years later, in 1997, despite 
privatization, Thatcher was to again show her “intervening” hand when she physically reacted to 
BA’s re-branding which had moved away from the Union Jack, the national emblem of the 
U.K.43  Thatcher’s gesture was indicative of a nation still staking claim to its former flag-carrier 
and a country wanting to remain “British;” which is perhaps substantiated and reinforced by 
Thatcher’s uttering, when covering up the new model aircraft’s tailfin design with her 
handkerchief, “[w]e fly the British flag, not these awful things.”44 
Over time, BA has continued to embrace the opportunities afforded by the more open and 
liberalized aviation area within the EU in order to achieve further profitability; but, at times, it 
also voiced opposition to developments which were to see this concept being further extended 
externally.  The principle of the Internal Aviation Market is based upon extending the Open 
Skies initiative by creating an Open Aviation Area (OAA) within the EU.  This led to the 
concept of the Community carrier and, consequently, removal of the substantial 
ownership/effective control and traffic rights limitations.  As a consequence, BA is now the 
leading partner within the IAG holding group,45 which has seen the original partner – Spanish 
Iberia (the former flag carrier of Spain) being joined by fellow Spanish (hybrid) airline Vueling, 
and most recently the former flag carrier of the Irish Republic – Aer Lingus, in what is truly a 
union of European airlines.  Without EU membership, this would not have been conceivable or 
feasible, and this inevitably raises questions concerning future unity in view of the U.K. Brexit 
                                                        
42 Council Regulation 1008/2008, Common Rules for the Operation of Air Services in the Community, 2008 O.J. (L 
293) 3–20. 
43 Classic Thatcher on BA, YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 1997), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78CqcbwFeBA. 
44 See Dirk Beveridge, Thatcher Takes Aim at British Airways Tail Logos, APNEWSARCHIVE.COM, 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1997/Thatcher-takes-aim-at-British-Airways-tail-logos/id-
c5a90438a0daf5287b2a3acd7403fc89. 
45 IAG = International Airlines Group. 
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vote – and “if” and “in what form” the U.K. should/will leave the EU.  And what will this mean 
to such partnerships, and to U.K. airlines in Europe and external to it? 
However, such a union between two States of the EU was not a new concept to aviation; 
and, while the transfer of more than a 49 percent shareholding may not have previously occurred 
within the EU, there had been some significant and high-profile commercial interaction among 
EU airlines before the Community carrier concept had been recognized.  Of particular note was 
the development of the supersonic Concorde airliner by, somewhat ironically perhaps, the U.K. 
and France, a fact that de Gaulle, while not supporting the U.K. joining the EU, had also 
positively remarked on in 1963.46  That said, opposition to the “nationality clause” and the 
potential transfer of shares and ownership of airlines outside of the State of origin also became 
more than apparent during the so-called “Open Skies” judgment by the CJEU in 2002.47  The 
U.K. was one of seven countries that had concluded individual open skies agreements with the 
United States, arguably to the detriment of the other Member States of the Union.  Such separate 
and non-aligned bilateral agreements were deemed, through the Open Skies judgment, to have 
breached Community law because the clause on the ownership and control of airlines constituted 
discrimination against the other (non-participant) Member States.  The cases also reinforced the 
right of establishment of airlines in any of the other Member States.  The judgment, in essence, 
was to result in a more aligned approach being taken in respect to both the internal and external 
aviation policy direction.  This included clarifying the distribution of power and competence 
between the EU and its Member States, particularly in the field of the regulation of international 
air services. 
4.1. The U.K. and the EU (Internal and External) – Progression! 
4.1.1. Internally:  A Case Study (easyJet) 
The packages of measures (Table 1) allowed the U.K., alongside the other Member 
States, to be part of what is recognized as the most liberalized aviation market in the world.  The 
EU effectively managed to achieve what was unable to be resolved in 1944 as part of the 
Chicago Convention negotiations, and that is integrated economic access to Member States’ 
markets.  This, arguably, improved internal (fair) competition, allowing establishment of bases in 
any one of the Member States while also allowing for majority control and ownership outside of 
the respective country, creating one “open aviation area,” which extends far beyond the principle 
of open skies. 
Following on from the U.S. deregulation strategy, part of the liberalization process also 
resulted in the development and rise of the low cost carrier (LCC) market, with the early 
European leaders originating in Ireland:  Ryanair being formed in 1985 and easyJet in 1995.48  In 
the early period, easyJet initially operated just two routes from London Luton to Glasgow and 
                                                        
46 French President Charles de Gaulle, Press Conference at The Elysee, Paris:  Veto on British Membership in the 
EEC (Jan. 14, 1963). 
47 Case C-466/98, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. I-9427; Case C-467/98, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2002 
E.C.R. I-9519; Case C-468/98, Comm’n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-9575; Case C-469/98, Comm’n v. Finland, 2002 
E.C.R. I-9627; Case-471/98, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-9681; Case C-472/98, Comm’n v. Luxembourg, 
2002 E.C.R. I-9741; Case C-475/98, Comm’n v. Austria, 2002 E.C.R. I-9797; Case C-476/98, Comm’n v. Germany, 
2002 E.C.R. 9855. 
48 Jaap G. de Wit & Joost Zuidberg, The Growth of the Low Cost Carrier Model, 21 J. Air Transp. Mgmt. 17–23 
(July 2012). 
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Edinburgh, before introducing its Amsterdam route in 1996.  In just over 20 years, the airline has 
experienced remarkable growth, which saw its shares being floated on the London Stock 
Exchange in 2000.  Gatwick was added as the fifth base in 2001, and very quickly was to result 
in the airline establishing itself as the second-largest scheduled carrier at the airport.  The current 
headquarters remains, however, in the U.K.’s Luton Airport. 
Currently, easyJet operates over 820 routes across more than 30 countries, both within 
and external to the EU.  It employs over 10,000 people and fully embraces the advantages 
afforded by operating out of bases within mainland Europe.  While a third of its capacity is due 
to its home position within the U.K., the mainland bases in Europe have allowed easyJet to 
maximize cabotage opportunities, with planned expansion and development continuing into 
2017.49  EasyJet is, in essence, a pan-European airline, which is making maximum use of the 
traffic rights that the U.K.’s membership in the EU has provided to it.  This has ultimately 
advantaged the company, the shareholders, and the passengers, who constitute a “new kind of 
user” from all over the EU and adjoining countries.  This “newer” LCC airline model has 
afforded the opportunity of air travel to EU citizens who had in the past, arguably, not been able 
to afford flying – which, prior to deregulation, had been viewed as a luxury means of travel.  
Most importantly, it has advantaged the European Union per se.  In essence, the low cost carrier 
model has allowed EU countries to be linked with ease, so perhaps it is with some irony that 
British flyers have not appreciated fully the advantages and opportunities afforded them through 
the U.K.’s membership in the EU.  EasyJet has brought prosperity, too, to the U.K., and 
embraced technology in its business model, now being one of the top-10 e-commerce retailers in 
the U.K.; and yet, the voters arguably failed to take into account the possible effects of an exit 
vote on one of the U.K.’s leading businesses. 
Other customer benefits that have resulted through EU membership and the creation of an 
internal market include increased competitiveness – which has not only driven down prices but 
has also resulted in a measurably higher quality of service, as well as consistency in terms of 
safety and security.  Hence, common rules have overlapped into adjoining areas of customer 
protection in the event of airline insolvency, delayed bookings, damage and personal injury, etc.  
These have arisen through changes in both the economic and regulatory landscape, which have 
extended into the external aviation arena. 
4.1.2. Externally 
The basis of the EU’s external aviation policy is to create closer international relations.   
In essence, there has been a three-pillar “external” approach since 2005,50 whereby: 
(1) Bilateral agreements not in line with EU law are to be amended so as to ensure 
that all EU airlines are on an equal footing and that the concept of EU designation 
is recognized in conformity with EU law.  This is the basis of the EU Horizontal 
                                                        
49 About Us, EASYJET PLC, http://corporate.easyjet.com/about-easyjet.aspx.  See also EasyJet, Routes Online, 
http://www.routesonline.com/airlines/3452/easyjet/50/route-exchange-airline-requirements/. 
50 See External Aviation Policy, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/external_aviation_policy/index_en.htm (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2016). 
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Agreements as per Regulation 847/2004.51 
(2) The EU has positively worked to develop a Common Aviation Area with 
adjoining countries whereby it has extended the concept of opening up the 
internal market, including regulatory harmonization, and internal EU aviation 
legislation and regulation with its neighbors.  
(3) The EU continues to negotiate comprehensive agreements to integrate the EU 
aviation markets with its key trading partners – based upon the concept of market 
opening, removal of investment barriers, regulatory convergence, and 
cooperation. 
The U.K. has actively benefitted from all three pillars of this approach, which is further 
developed in the EU’s 2015 “Aviation Strategy for Europe,” whereby the objective is to “enable 
European aviation (to collectively) flourish globally.”52 
The 2015 Aviation Strategy extends the external aviation agreements with several 
identified countries and regions around the world and is based upon the concept of increased 
connectivity and hence growth; increased competition resulting in lower prices; and an increase 
in the number of flights and routes, thus giving more choices to all participants.  One underlying 
premise is the establishment of common rules, which builds upon the success and approach of 
the internal market.  This also extends to recognizing and tackling the limitations and challenges 
to aviation growth through capacity constraints and limitations, both in the air and on the ground.  
In this respect, one of the most capacity-constrained airports in the EU remains in the U.K., at 
London Heathrow.  Of course, it should be acknowledged that EU internal legislation has also 
had an impact in ensuring a consistency of approach with respect to ground handling services,53 
slot allocation,54 and environmental factors (to name but a few areas) through Directives and 
other legislative and regulatory means. 
To date, no agreement made under the third pillar – with a trading partner outside the EU 
(other than European Economic Area States) – has seen anywhere near the same liberal and free 
market access opportunities as the EU has enjoyed internally.  While the objective is to 
strengthen the goal of ensuring fair competition, ultimately there are always winners and losers, 
which invariably has links to sovereign supremacy, in this case a trading advantage.55 
Noticeably however, agreements have since been achieved by the EU with the United 
States and several other key countries but, that said, the two open skies agreements with the 
U.S.56 still did not lead to the same degree of openness as had been hoped for in terms of both 
market access and share transfer/investments (i.e. the removal of ownership restrictions).  The 
principle had been to create a transatlantic Open Aviation Area, a single air transport market 
                                                        
51 Council Regulation 847/2004, Negotiation and Implementation of Air Service Agreements between Member 
States and Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 7–17. 
52 External Aviation Policy, supra note 50. 
53 Council Directive 96/67/EC, Access to the Groundhandling Market at Community Airports, 1996 O.J. (L 272) 36. 
54 Council Regulation 95/93, Common Rules for the Allocation of Slots at Community Airports, 1993 O.J. (L 14) 1–
6. 
55 Sarah Jane Fox, Presentation at the 14th World Conference on Transport Research, Shanghai (July 2016). 
56 Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-EU, Apr. 30, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 134) 4, 46 I.L.M. 470, as amended by Protocol to 
Amend the Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-EU, Mar. 25, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 223) 3.  The (First Stage) Agreement 
was applied March 30, 2008; the Protocol (Second Stage) was applied June 24, 2010. 
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between the two unions of States, including access to the domestic markets of both parties.  It 
should be recalled that the CJEU’s 2002 Open Skies judgment had found that Member States had 
acted discriminatorily and contrary to the principle of EU law by concluding individual bilateral 
agreements, which in turn had limited the freedom of establishment of Community companies. 
 
Yet, the first joint Community negotiations with the U.S. proved to be unpopular, particularly 
with the U.K.57 
This was based upon the position of the former flag carrier BA and the U.K.’s stance to 
arguably protect the airline’s favorable position, together with London Heathrow.  During the 
ensuing lengthy negotiations to conclude an agreement, the subject was broached and debated in 
the U.K. Parliament,58 wherein it was questioned as to whether 
there [was] not a grave danger that the United Kingdom, which has premier status 
on the north Atlantic route in particular, could lose that position in the longer term 
through its extraordinary decision to allow the European Union to negotiate on its 
behalf air service agreements that should properly be the interest of our country 
alone?59 
Adding that the U.K. was effectively being “asked to sign up to a deal between the 
Commission and the United States Government that is supposed to provide a much more liberal 
regime for airlines in Europe and the U.S.,” the Shadow Transport Minister, Damian Green, 
argued, “the deal that the Commission has negotiated is a bad one for large parts of the UK 
aviation industry.  It will open up Heathrow to all US carriers, and give US carriers unlimited 
access to carry passengers and cargo within and beyond the EU.”60 
“Reports in early 2006 indicated that British Airways was concerned that more than one-
third of its operating profits could be ‘wiped out’ if a deal was agreed, due to the opening up of 
London Heathrow.”61  In essence, the EU-U.S. Air Transport Agreement (eventually signed just 
over a year later, on April 25 and 30, 2007) was to raise serious concerns in the U.K. as to the 
negative impact to “its” industry; sentiments which arguably were firmly in contradiction to the 
EU principle of equal market opportunity for all the Member States.  This was also in contrast to 
a report prepared for the European Commission by U.S. consultants, The Brattle Group, which 
estimated that the conclusion of an EU-U.S. Open Skies agreement would generate upwards of 
17 million extra passengers a year, provide “consumer benefits” of at least $5 billion a year, and 
boost employment on both sides of the Atlantic.62  And, while BA (and Virgin Atlantic) had 
expressed disdain, a fellow airline of the time, bmi, had long been lobbying both the U.K. and 
the EU for more opportunity for access to the U.S. and it eagerly welcomed the EU/U.S. 
agreement.  Surprisingly, however, it was later to make the announcement that it would not be 
entering the North Atlantic market.63 
                                                        
57 Sarah Jane Fox & Rosida Ismail, The Skies the Limit! Open Skies – with Limitations!, 4 Eur. J. Comp. L. & 
Governance (forthcoming 2017). 
58 422 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2004) Deb 08 cols. 175–244. 
59 Mr. John Wilkinson (Conservative MP). 
60 422 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2004) Deb 08 cols. 188–89. 
61 Id. 
62 The Brattle Group, The Economic Impact of an EU-US Open Aviation Area (2002). 
63 Barry Humphreys & Peter Morrell, The Potential Impacts of the EU/US Open Sky Agreement:  What Will Happen 
at Heathrow After Spring 2008?, 15 J. Air Transport Mgmt. 72–77 (2009). 
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Whether or not the U.K. was protecting its interests in isolation is contestable.  However, 
the U.K. did, at that time, account for a 40 percent share of the EU-U.S. market.  The U.K. Select 
Committee’s view was that the U.S. had achieved access to the EU market (and most particularly 
London Heathrow) without conceding anything on the key issues of cabotage in U.S. airspace, or 
foreign ownership or control of U.S. airlines. So, unsurprisingly, negotiations leading to the EU-
U.S. Open Skies Stage II agreement were commenced almost immediately, starting on May 15, 
2008 in Ljubljana, Slovenia.64 
Little has been voiced by BA (publicly) following the five years since the implementation 
of the Protocol to amend the (Stage I) Air Transport Agreement between the EU and the U.S., 
and certainly the business strategy and developments that have ensued in this period would have 
a profound effect on any current decision on the transatlantic route.  During this time, the U.K., 
as a member of the EU, has also been party to other comprehensive aviation agreements with 
other nations and during the negotiation periods, the same degree of protest registered during the 
EU/U.S. talks has not been repeated. 
What is now evident is the fact that the U.K. has become fully entwined in a global EU 
aviation policy, inextricably linked to negotiations concluded through the EU, both externally 
and internally.  This ultimately could be viewed as a complex honeycomb structure resulting in a 
lattice of cells inevitably providing honey – or an explosive minefield to negotiate – following 
the Brexit referendum results. 
 
5. BREXIT:  U.K. (EU) Regression! 
In truth, what Brexit will mean to airlines and the supporting infrastructure, including 
airports and customers, remains unclear and ultimately speculative.  This uncertainty is therefore 
of concern, given the various possibilities that could transpire.  As evidenced within a day of the 
referendum results, uncertainty affects profits, with share prices of IAG and other British carriers 
being among the hardest hit in the initial 24-hour period, and in many instances witnessing the 
lowest plunge since 1985.  In fact, BA was the first company to warn that the vote to leave the 
EU would hit its profits.  This is, of course, a similar warning to that given by the company in 
connection with the EU-U.S. Open Skies agreements.  On June 24, 2016, IAG shares were 
recorded to be down 20.2 percent at £421.10, while easyJet shares were 19.2 percent lower at 
£12.37, both being among the heaviest losers in the FTSE 100.65 
The future for aviation is ultimately dependent upon the solutions and conclusions 
reached between the U.K. and the EU regarding the degree of separation that is desired or 
feasible.  But this remains complex, given the framework and lattice structure that currently 
exists across all of the Treaties areas.  However, the fact remains that it will not be a quick or 
easy solution and, while there has been some recovery in the U.K. airlines’ share prices,66 the 
                                                        
64 It had been clearly stated that negotiations on the second stage would commence within 60 days of the date of 
provisional application of the first part (originally Oct. 28, 2007, finally Mar. 30, 2008).  
65 Shares, The Telegraph, http://shares.telegraph.co.uk/ (last visited June 24, 2016); Ben Martin, British Airways 
Owner IAG Sounds Profit Warning Within Hours of Brexit Result, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (June 24, 2016, 11:02 AM),  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/06/24/british-airways-owner-sounds-profit-warning-within-hours-of-
brex/. 
66 For example, by early August 2016 IAG had recovered some of the near-30 percent drop in its price suffered 
immediately after the vote. 
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industry consensus is that this decision will result in challenges over the coming years.  Amid the 
myriad of uncertainties, the U.K. is unlikely to see extra investment in infrastructure, such as a 
third runway at Heathrow to reduce capacity constraints or aid airlines’ route growth. 
To appreciate why this is so complex, it is important to realize that the U.K.’s 
membership in the EU resulted in supremacy of EU law and hence the first step, other than 
formally applying to withdraw from the EU through Article 50 TEU,67 is to repeal the European 
Communities Act 1972.  However, a high percentage of U.K. legislation results from EU law 
and policy; while Regulations become directly applicable,68 Directives require implementation 
into U.K. law resulting in a related (and joined) U.K. Statutory Instrument.  This means that the 
U.K. will need to decide which parts of EU-originated legislation to keep, and of course this 
remains subject ultimately to the end-relationship with Brussels.  In essence, once the 
relationship with Brussels changes, so inevitably will the legislation. 
The CJEU has also interpreted EU law where questions or concerns have been identified, 
which has had an influence in directing policy – as has been seen in the 2002 Open Skies 
judgment.  The U.K. referendum largely implied that British citizens wanted independence from 
“all” the influence and control of Brussels, therefore suggesting that this includes the influence 
on U.K. jurisprudence.  However, unraveling previous interpretations and EU-originated laws 
from the U.K. is a momentous task – one that may not be achievable.  Just as Roman law69 has 
had a residual impact on the U.K., inevitably so will EU law and policy. 
The above only touches the surface of EU legislation that has had an impact upon the 
development and direction of aviation in the U.K.  Invariably, removal of all or some could 
significantly change the landscape and the position of the U.K.  The underlying concern to 
aviation remains on two fronts:  (i) the position re internal aviation relations after Brexit; and 
hence, (ii) where this leaves external relations, which are ultimately closely linked to the 
determinant of (i). 
This said, the EU referendum question was phrased in such a way that “leaving” did not 
convey the sheer significance of the ability to access the internal market if the vote was for the 
U.K. to leave the European Union.  The question asked was: 
 “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the 
European Union?”  
The fundamental issue here is that the two aspects are inextricably linked. 
5.1. Internal Access 
One of the biggest benefits afforded by EU membership is the fact that any airline owned 
and controlled by nationals of any EU Member State is permitted open access within the EU, 
meaning the airline is allowed to operate anywhere within the internal market without 
restrictions on capacity, frequency, or pricing.  The approach has led to the Community carrier 
                                                        
67 See supra note 7. 
68 Which means they are directly implemented into U.K. law without the need for legislation from the U.K. 
Parliament. 
69 Edward D. Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 447 (1961), 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1673&context=flr. 
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concept, whereby ownership and nationality restrictions, for EU citizens, have been removed. 
Ceasing to be an EU member would technically see the advantages of membership being 
removed, with any access (and associated benefits) having to be renegotiated.  It is unlikely that 
aviation will be renegotiated in isolation however, given the overlap into adjoining areas such as 
the freedom of establishment, free movement of persons and goods, 
discrimination/discriminatory barriers to trade, consumer rights and protection, and even related 
labor laws, etc. 
The discussions will therefore center on reaching an achievable solution – which stands 
to affect not only the U.K. but the remaining 27 Member States, as well as arguably non-EU 
States under some scenarios. 
5.1.1. The European Common Aviation Area 
While there are some alternative models already in existence, such as the European 
Common Aviation Area (ECAA), this is by no means a given solution permitting internal access, 
as is now enjoyed.  The ECAA is a multilateral agreement based upon two conditions:  (i) the 
acceptance of EU aviation laws; and (ii) the establishment of a “framework of close economic 
cooperation, such as an Association Agreement” with the EU.70 
Arguably, the new aviation strategy could see changes to these conditions developing 
over time, and while the U.K. now has a say on such developments, as a member only through 
the ECAA this level of input will be reduced.  It will effectively lose much of its lobbying clout 
within Europe, which, like many of the proposed solutions, actually places the U.K. in a weaker 
position than it presently has.  Currently, the U.K. is a member of the ECAA, as are all the EU 
States, but membership also extends to Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, as well as several Balkan 
countries.  Continued membership therefore remains dependent upon the agreement of existing 
members as well as the two broad conditions.  Certainly, there is nothing within the ECAA 
agreement that covers the current situation in terms of an EU State leaving the union and 
retaining the automatic right or entitlement to access through the ECAA. 
5.1.2. A U.K.-EU Bilateral/Horizontal Agreement 
Technically, it would be possible to create a bespoke agreement as has happened with 
Switzerland (Swiss-EU) or even on similar lines as the EU-U.S. model.  Of course, this is subject 
to variable levels and limits. 
As has been discussed, the EU-U.S. Air Transport Agreement did not realize the same 
level of cooperation as has been achieved internally, and hence there are significant limitations – 
such as full market access and also restrictions on substantial ownership and effective control. 
While the Swiss-EU model is far more accommodating, by providing mutual market 
access for airlines of both parties, it also effectively binds Switzerland into much of the EU’s 
aviation legislation.  And, in much the same way as discussed previously, in terms of the ECAA, 
this would be without the same discussion rights as previously accorded to the U.K. through EU 
                                                        
70 Multilateral Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, the Republic of Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, the Republic of Iceland, the Republic of Montenegro, the Kingdom of Norway, Romania, the Republic 
of Serbia and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo on the establishment of a European 
Common Aviation Area art. 32, 2006 O.J. (L 285) 3, 11. 
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Membership.  The Swiss-EU model also takes into account other related EU legislation and 
policy; hence there is in fact an extended series of related agreements – all effectively tied 
together, whereby Switzerland complies with the related four freedoms that form the foundations 
for the EU’s single market. 
Although these models show that it is possible to conclude a bespoke agreement, there 
are other warnings here perhaps, too: 
(1) The EU is unlikely to concede an advantage to the U.K. (as arguably 
occurred in the EU-U.S. Agreement).  And while the U.K. would perhaps 
wish to retain all the benefits it currently has, in terms of open access and 
operating anywhere within the internal market without restrictions on 
capacity, frequency, pricing, or ownership limitation, etc., this will no 
doubt also come at a price, if a compromise/solution is able to be 
achieved.  While this may not directly be to the detriment of aviation, it 
could have an influence on some other policy areas. 
(2) Continuing from the above point:  policies and legislation are ultimately 
joined; acceptance of one area, or the rebuff of one, will stand to have an 
effect on an adjoining area. 
(3) Whatever the solution/conclusion, the U.K. is unlikely to have the 
influence and voice in the area of aviation within Europe that it currently 
has. 
The likelihood of the U.K. negotiating bilateral agreements with each Member State of 
the EU has largely been discounted on the basis that the CJEU would likely view such pacts in 
the same way as it did in the 2002 Open Skies judgment, namely that any individual agreement 
was contrary to EU law and discriminated against the other EU Member States. 
One of the worst scenarios envisaged, however, would be the inability to reach a 
compromise and put any agreement in place.  If such a situation occurred, resolution likely 
would be sought through international law, and hence the Chicago Convention, to which all 
Member States are individually party (as opposed to collectively as represented by the EU).  In 
many ways, this could strike at the very issue of legal order and governance, from a national, 
regional, and international perspective.  It would be perhaps an ironic situation for the U.K. to 
find itself in, given that it has ultimately fought to retain or regain sovereignty out of the hands 
of the EU, and while the Chicago Convention recognizes the rights of nations to conclude their 
own agreements with fellow nations, the EU ultimately could influence other contracting nations. 
Inevitably, the high risk potential is that the U.K. will find itself in a regressive position, 
particularly from the situation it currently enjoys.  And arguably, this could be viewed to be the 
present situation and start of this backward move, given the degree of uncertainty and the lengthy 
time it will take to resolve matters.  Of course this extends to external relations, too. 
5.2. External Repercussions 
EU membership advantages extend beyond the internal market and hence both aspects 
remain linked.  Membership therefore brings benefits to a country (and hence its airlines and 
airports) through Air Services Agreements, negotiated with third parties by the EU on behalf of 
all Member States.  The most significant of these is the so-called EU-U.S. Open Skies 
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Agreement (discussed supra) which now provides that the airlines of both parties are entitled to 
fly from anywhere in the EU to anywhere in the U.S. and vice versa, although it does not allow 
access within the domestic market. 
While meeting with some opposition from the U.K., particularly during the First Stage 
negotiations, the EU-U.S. Agreement has ultimately been viewed as a precondition for the U.S. 
to give antitrust immunity (ATI) to the joint ventures (JV) of the airlines within the three 
strategic global alliances.  This is significant to all three airline alliances and their carriers within 
the U.S. and within the EU.  Of course, this is particularly relevant to the oneworld alliance, 
since BA (not IAG) is identified specifically within the JV-ATI and the U.K. is a signatory to the 
Agreement.  That said, party to the same Agreement are the ECAA States – Norway and Iceland, 
so invariably it could be argued that it would be in all parties’ interest to allow the U.K. to retain 
this position.  But inevitably this remains tied to the solution achieved internally. 
It could result in the U.K. establishing new trading relationships, including Air Services 
Agreements, with the rest of the world.  While it has been argued that this could be positive in 
some instances, the U.K. would lack the bargaining power of the EU and the 500 million citizens 
of this trading bloc.71  It would also be a very lengthy process and only part of the difficulties 
that could arise as a result of the U.K. exit from the EU.  
In the interim period, it has been argued that if agreements are not reached – particularly 
within the timeline after withdrawal under Article 50 has been commenced, subject to agreed 
extensions – then provisions could revert back to the last prior agreements in place.  For the 
U.S./U.K., this could see a return to the 1977 Bermuda II72 bilateral (or Bermuda two-and-a-half, 
following some moderations in 1980) agreement, which was in place before the EU-U.S. air 
services agreements were reached.  It is unlikely BA would, or even could, return to the previous 
situation, as the airline has in effect moved on considerably, evolving and adapting to the new 
regulatory environment and to the opportunities afforded it – predominately due to the U.K.’s 
membership in the EU.  In essence, BA no longer exists as a stand-alone company in its own 
right.  The consequences of such a possible return to the pre-EU-U.S. ASA would predictably be 
disastrous to all:  the U.K., the U.S., and all Member States of the EU and ECAA, no doubt 
resulting in a backward move to a more restricted, regressive setting.73 
5.3. U.K. – Airlines 
The Brexit decision has certainly resulted in anxious times for U.K. airlines.  The 
creation of the liberalized internal aviation market has been recognized to be the primary catalyst 
behind the rapid development of LCCs in Europe.  And hence, the U.K.’s position in the internal 
market particularly stands to affect an LCC such as easyJet.  Immediately following the 
referendum result, Carolyn McCall, the chief executive of easyJet, was reported as saying that 
she was “confident” in the “business model and our ability to continue to deliver our successful 
strategy . . . .”74 
                                                        
71 The Impact of ‘BREXIT’ on U.K. Air Transport, IATA (June 2016), 
https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/impact_of_brexit.pdf. 
72 Air Services Agreement, U.S.-U.K., July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S. No. 8641 [hereinafter Bermuda II].  
73 Id. 
74 Victoria Bryan, European Airlines Slump on Brexit Vote, IAG Warns on Profit, REUTERS.COM (June 24, 2016, 
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That said, this inescapably remains subject to the U.K.’s position within the EU and 
hence the “new relationship.”  So perhaps her confidence was a little premature, as on June 24, 
she also acknowledged, “[easyJet] have today written to the U.K. Government and the European 
Commission to ask them to prioritize the U.K. remaining part of the single EU aviation market, 
given its importance to trade and consumers.”75 
EasyJet is said to have been exploring setting up a different business model including 
obtaining an air operator’s certificate (AOC) through a local holding company, and using its 
Swiss AOC and its Swiss subsidiary more; hence a clear indicator that easyJet’s business model 
will not necessarily work so well post-Brexit.76  Such proposed changes would see less reliance 
on the U.K. as its primary operating base, but the timing could be questioned and explored by the 
EU and the success of a changed business model has not been tested by the company.  However, 
if this should occur, the U.K. economy and consumers would ultimately be the losers.  As for its 
rival Ryanair (a Republic of Ireland LCC), while it might stand to make further gains as a result 
of any negative change experienced by easyJet, it also might suffer as a result of the U.K. exit 
because it currently works out of major bases in the U.K.  The possible scenario here is that it 
may choose to close those bases, which economically would have a negative impact on the U.K. 
As for easyJet, the worst-case scenario is more substantial, since the airline might lose the 
benefits accorded to it in the EU through the U.K.’s membership.  This could ultimately be 
disastrous for the airline and the U.K.77 
Other airlines are, of course, also affected.  FlightGlobal recently made reference to a 
newly published report regarding the U.K. regional carrier Flybe in which it was stated that, “[i]t 
is hard to imagine a business more exposed to the current portfolio of adverse developments.”78  
Flybe also confirms the fact that the decision to leave has and will continue to have a “materially 
adverse” effect on the airline.79 
The day after the referendum result, IAG was reported as having said it believed “that the 
vote to leave the European Union will not have a long term material impact on its business.”80  
That said, the legal position of IAG (and the airlines under its umbrella) would have to be 
questioned to ensure that this level of confidence is realistic.  It is, by all accounts, a very 
unusual and complex situation for BA – an airline that arguably now survives only through a 
retained name.  Upon this basis, it is no doubt true that the holding group set-up provides more 
security and reassurance to BA, for in reality it has ceased to exist.  Depending upon the outcome 
and solutions of the U.K. exit from the EU, it may in fact be necessary to revisit the composition 
of IAG – which is now a complex legal minefield of merged European airlines that would take 
years to untangle. 
                                                        
75 Martin, supra note 65. 
76 Depending, of course, upon the degree of separation from the EU. 
77 Ben Martin & Ben Marlow, EasyJet Eyes New European Operation if Britain Flies Solo, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (June 
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Initially, the original airlines involved – BA and Iberia – merged the two companies 
through a complex system of share exchanges, which led to the creation of the new, European 
airline group.  The two companies subsequently signed the Merger Agreement on April 8, 2010.  
But, while it is openly said that the merger was achieved by inserting the Spanish 
company – International Consolidated Airlines Group, S.A. (IAG) – as the new holding company 
of British Airways and Iberia, this is somewhat misleading and arguably contradictory to say the 
least.  Prior to the transaction with IAG, BA was held by BA Holdco (a now-dormant entity), and 
it was through the BA Holdco arrangement that Iberia and what was BA were merged, by means 
of a Spanish domestic merger, into what is now IAG.  Therefore, BA effectively ceased to exist 
as of the full completion of the merger in January 2011, with shares then being traded only under 
the name of IAG.  BA has now become immersed into a Spanish company registered in Madrid, 
albeit with its headquarters (IAG) in London. 
There is no denying that over a period of nearly 30 years (following privatization in 
1987), BA has changed significantly under a more liberalized regime.  The U.K.’s membership 
in the EU has provided opportunities for mergers with other European carriers, which has 
resulted in BA’s survival as merely a brand, associated with a past national identity, which also 
importantly has provided slots and other rights that it retains in the U.K.  While this remains 
acceptable today, it could, however, be further reviewed and investigated in the future, 
depending upon the outcome of the U.K. exit and the consequences to the internal market and 
external relations.  The complacency and confidence of IAG may be well placed; however, there 
may be a “but” in the equation – in the future. 
The Brexit decision affects all U.K. airline business models, including those flying to the 
U.K., as “no airline type will be immune from the impacts.”81  However, dependent upon the 
U.K. exit resolution, British air carriers could be prevented from merging with airlines within the 
EU – which could result in financial ruin and ultimately the demise of other known U.K. brands 
that would not enjoy the same opportunities as experienced by BA.  Inevitably, this could result 
in a reduced market; certainly it will be a changed market.   
And what about the end users – the customers?82  There is no doubt that the majority of 
voters had absolutely no concept of the possible effects on the airlines, the airports, the economy 
and, ultimately, them – as customers.  They no doubt expected it to be business as usual.  As 
Newton’s law of motion aptly states, though – for every action there is an equal and opposite re-
action83 (or, arguably in this case, “fallout”).  Those enjoying their cheaper-priced flights on 
easyJet, for example, may find prices increasing, or fewer opportunities to fly out of the U.K. to 
various destinations in the EU – both flight frequency and locations could ultimately be reduced. 
As stated supra, the position with regard to EU Regulations and Directives remains 
unknown – namely whether individual ones would be retained, changed, or collectively 
maintained, etc.  Some of the wording may, of course, need to be revised, depending upon the 
outcome of the solution going forward after the U.K. ceases to be an EU Member State.  In terms 
of passenger rights, for example, while in the main there would be some type of protection, 
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83 Sir Isaac Newton, 1 Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy 20 (Andrew Motte trans., 1729). 
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certain aspects would need to be revisited.  Taking, as an example, the Regulation on common 
rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and 
cancellation or long delay of flights,84 within the legislation reference is made to related 
Directives and Regulations, not least in terms of defining a “Community carrier.”  This is 
specifically defined as “an air carrier with a valid operating licence granted by a Member State in 
accordance with the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2407/92. . . .”85  Obviously, the 
position with regard to U.K. carriers holding an operating license granted by a Member State 
remains to be defined and clarified.  The operator may well have been granted a license when the 
U.K. “was” a Member State but going forward, for example, this will need to be confirmed – 
would a license cease on the day membership ceased?  Under the new agreement and 
arrangements would a U.K. airline still be eligible?  While within Europe, a U.K. resident would 
no doubt still be entitled to make a claim under the terms of the Regulation – since Article 3 
states that the Regulation shall apply: 
3(1)(b)  to passengers departing from an airport located in a third country to an 
airport situated in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies . . . 
if the operating carrier of the flight concerned is a Community carrier. 
And at, 
3(1)(a)  to passengers departing from an airport in the territory of a Member State 
to which the Treaty applies. 
In essence, the entire process of withdrawing from the EU will have social, economic, 
and regulatory limitations and consequences, and there will be many issues that need to be 
resolved that impact upon the airlines, the airports, and the end-users – the customers.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The Brexit vote sent shockwaves across the U.K., but the aftereffects were and continue 
to be felt across Europe and further afield.  The complexity of the relationship with the EU 
means that severing this connection or removing isolated strands is a momentous task, which 
will also have reverberating consequences.  That said, even the “decision” is questioned as 
actually being final.  A referendum decision is, according to many expert sources, not legally 
binding.  Within a matter of weeks after the poll, a group of leading lawyers in the U.K. had 
petitioned the government that their “legal opinion is that the referendum is advisory.”86  Article 
50 TEU has not yet been invoked; the rationale also being that in order to trigger Article 50 there 
must first be primary legislation.  
While the U.K. does not have a written Constitution, Articles 1 and 2 of the Bill of Rights 
of 1689, which remains in force today, expressly provides that no body apart from Parliament 
                                                        
84 Council Regulation 261/2004, Compensation of Air Passengers Denied Boarding, 2004 O.J. (L 46) 1–8. 
85 Id. at 3, art. 2(c). 
86 See UK Government Faces Pre-Emptive Legal Action over Brexit Decision, THEGUARDIAN.COM (July 4, 2016, 
2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/jul/03/parliament-must-decide-whether-or-not-to-leave-the-eu-
say-lawyers. 
Published in Issues in Aviation Law and Policy. Vol. 16 Autumn 2016 Number 1. 
(Subject to minor changes/formatting) 
 25 
itself can override an act of Parliament, which invariably adds further credence to the need for a 
decision from the U.K. government (and not one based upon the U.K. referendum).87 
 Even the predicted date, in early 2017, to officially notify the EU looks set to be further 
pushed back as Prime Minster Theresa May’s EU Brexit advisory team is only now being 
established and hence is not ready to enter the formal negotiation process.  In the meantime, 
Owen Smith, the Labour candidate, has reaffirmed that under his leadership he would ensure a 
vote against commencing the Article 50 process, believing that a second referendum or general 
election is first needed, if the exit decision is to be further pursued. 
That said, P.M. May maintains that “Brexit means Brexit,” but at what cost?  This 
statement, as was the referendum decision, remains an irresponsible course of action, not just for 
aviation but for the country.  How the U.K. managed to make one of the “biggest decisions [the] 
country [had ever] face[d] in [the population’s] lifetimes:  whether to remain in a reformed EU or 
to leave,”88 without actually knowing what the consequences would be, will no doubt be 
reflected in history as one of the major failings of U.K. politics – ever!  The fact that one of the 
biggest Google searches in history occurred during the following days, after the referendum 
results were known, and asked “what is the EU?” only too clearly shows the absurdity of the 
situation.  In essence, the population made a decision without knowing what it would mean – 
there was no alternative “package” on offer.  Of course the EU is not perfect, but it has had many 
positive consequences, including one of the longest periods of unity and peace within Europe – 
but why the result was as it was remains largely conjecture.  That said, there are reasons that are 
more prominently acknowledged than others – such as immigration and the condition of the 
National Health Service.  Such negative views relating to both areas are largely attributed to the 
U.K.’s membership within Europe and the decisions emanating from Brussels.  While 
sovereignty may not specifically be cited, there was clear resentment of the perceived 
interference in national State affairs from the EU.  With some irony perhaps, other cited reasons 
are linked to the health of the economy, which has been interpreted as a north-south divide in 
England in terms of wage growth.  While the EU, and hence the U.K., may have experienced a 
recession or two within the last twenty years, the U.K. was showing clear signs of recovery.89 
In essence, the vote to leave was undoubtedly linked to a longing from the voters to turn 
the clock back – but what was hoped to be achieved is really again speculative; whether this was 
a desire to return to a different cultural existence long past, and a call against social change, 
particularly related to immigration, is highly disputed.  However, there remains a naiveté in 
seeking a return to a so-called “golden age,” and furthermore in actually believing it is 
achievable.  The world has moved on, the irony again being that the pioneering seafaring nation 
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of “Old Blighty” was instrumental in laying the very foundations for this global development and 
worldwide linkage through many centuries.  The U.K. was also a nation that was involved in 
positively seeking immigrants for employment (in healthcare and transport particularly), and this 
clearly predates EU membership.  In the 20th century this was most noticeable from the 1930s to 
the 1970s when successive U.K. governments recruited doctors and nurses from various 
continents.90  There is no doubt that while the sea has remained a key way to arrive in the U.K., it 
is now being surpassed by the modern travel mode for international connectivity (for the 
passenger at least) – the airplane.  The U.K. was again prominent in developing early flight 
routes to its former empire colonies, but the British Empire had collapsed about 10 years before 
EU membership, and somewhat ironically as a result of World War II. 
Of all those voting in the referendum, those in the age group under 77 will not recall a 
pre-WWII Britain and those under 44 will not recall a pre-EU one either.  The youth of today 
have embraced technology and communications, which also provide worldwide connectivity in 
much the same way as aviation does, and, arguably so have many of those who voted to exit the 
EU. 
While aviation has been driven by international agreements, most noticeably as a result of 
that compromise Convention achieved at Chicago during World War II, the EU has undoubtedly 
taken aviation to new heights.  The EU remains the most prosperous trading bloc in the world 
and one that has significantly enhanced global development and international prosperity.  
Internally, it has shown the power of unity and taken a massive leap above the concept of the 
Westphalian doctrine.  In terms of aviation, it remains a world leader and an example of 
achievement through liberalization.  IAG has shown that aviation can clearly surpass nationality 
and ownership by totally embracing the concept of union.  It has shown the power of joining 
airlines from different countries. 
But what of the future, post-Brexit? The answer is, it is up in the air, but the 
consequences of an exit, for all areas including aviation, must be seriously considered:  the 
warning has to be of red skies in the morning.  Ironically, if the U.K should fully separate from 
the EU it would stand to lose the symbol of this Union (e.g. on vehicle registration marks) but 
the U.K. is also likely to perhaps see the removal of the U.K. flag on its former air carrier and 
perhaps even witness the E.U. or Spanish flag replacing it on the tail of a British Airways plane.  
What would Thatcher and the U.K population have to say about that? 
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